Showing posts with label Chrysler. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Chrysler. Show all posts

Tuesday, May 06, 2014

Fiat Chrysler To Outline 5-Year Strategic Plan





by Tracy Samilton
May 06, 2014 4:33 AM ET

from
Listen to Story
Morning Edition

3 min 36 sec

The automaker reached most of the last targets which were set shortly after Fiat took over Chrysler in 2009. Fiat Chrysler's CEO will again answer questions about the company's long-term viability.


Source 

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Friday, January 03, 2014

Fiat to buy full control of Chrysler



By Mark M. Meinero @MMMCNNMoney January 2, 2014: 7:02 AM ET




Fiat has agreed to purchase remaining shares in Chrysler for $3.65 billion.


NEW YORK (CNNMoney)

U.S. automaker Chrysler will become fully owned by Italy's Fiat under terms of an agreement announced Wednesday that also involves the United Auto Workers union.

The agreement comes more than 4-1/2 years after the Obama administration brought Fiat in to keep Chrysler in business as part of a packaged bankruptcy proceeding.

In a statement, Fiat said it has agreed to pay $3.65 billion for the 41.46% of Chrysler it doesn't already own from the UAW's medical benefits trust for retirees.

Fiat shares gained nearly 13% in Milan early Thursday to trade at €6.70, their highest level since July 2011.

In addition to the deal, Chrysler will contribute $700 million to the benefits trust over a 4-year period. For its part, the UAW has agreed to support the automaker's plans to roll out vehicles and will drop a Delaware court proceeding over options exercised by Fiat in the acquisition of Chrysler.

Related: 2013: The year in cars

"The unified ownership structure will now allow us to fully execute our vision of creating a global automaker that is truly unique in terms of mix of experience, perspective and know-how, a solid and open organization that will ensure all employees a challenging and rewarding environment," said Sergio Marchionne, CEO of both Fiat and Chrysler.

The full takeover of Chrysler by Fiat means it will not have to go ahead with plans for aninitial public offering of Chrysler stock, which had been set to take place in the first three months of 2014.


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Friday, June 03, 2011

Recently-Released Documents Reveal Obama Administration’s Complicity in Deception about Auto Bailout

by Hans Bader on June 2, 2011

in Blog,Features


Obama Administration officials had advance notice that General Motors would run deceptive ads claiming to have paid taxpayers back for its bailout, and did not veto or object to those ads despite the opportunity to do so. Only later did Administration officials distance themselves from those deceptive claims, and they did so only after the falsity of those claims became so obvious to the public that they could no longer be parroted. Treasury Secretary Geithner had parroted those deceptive claims, which then drew criticism from the TARP inspector general, members of Congress, and financial reporters. Geithner publicly repeated GM’s deceptive claims, even though the Treasury Department had weeks in which to review GM’s claims and discover their inaccuracy.

Treasury Department Documents released last week in response to a think-tank’s Freedom of Information Act request make this clear. Those documents illustrate that GM and the Obama Administration coordinated GM’s PR strategy regarding the company’s controversial TV and print ad campaign in 2010, in which the car maker misleadingly claimed to have repaid what it received from taxpayers. In those ads, GM’s then-CEO, Ed Whitacre, claimed GM had already repaid its government bailout loan “in full, with interest, five years ahead of schedule.”

In May 2010, the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) filed a deceptive advertising complaint with the FTC, and GM shortly thereafter stopped running the ads. CEI also filed a Freedom of Information request with Treasury for documents on the ad campaign. Those documents were finally released late last month, after a year of delay – far beyond the 20-day legal deadline for responding to FOIA requests.

CEI General Counsel Sam Kazman laments that “the US Treasury Department aided General Motors in its fraudulent claim that it fully repaid its government loans,” pointing out that “the detailed nature of their cooperation is demonstrated in the documents that the Department has finally produced, 12 long months after our original request. Now, the Treasury Department is re-enacting this smoke-and-mirrors routine on behalf of Chrysler,” Kazman observed.

The documents show GM coordinating PR strategy with the Obama Administration more than three weeks before launching the campaign. The White House received some of those GM materials at least two weeks before the ad campaign began. The Treasury Department delayed in responding to CEI’s FOIA request until after GM and Chrysler’s profits temporarily spiked, leading to the Administration’s current PR campaign touting the alleged “success” of the auto bailout. For example, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner wrote a Washington Post Op-Ed on June 1, 2011 with a similarly-misleading statement that Chrysler had repaid its government loans. On June 3, Obama himself will give a speech in Toledo, Ohio defending the auto bailout.

The communications between the Treasury, the White House, and GM on this PR effort were extensive. Starting on March 30, 2010, Brian Deese from the Executive Office of the President and many Treasury Department officials began exchanging emails related to the announcement. (See pages 55-59, 97-102.) These emails included draft schedules, draft remarks to be given by GM CEO Ed Whitacre, and draft press releases from both GM and the Treasury Department. See pp. 9-14; 18-24; 36-39; 83-96.

The Treasury Department saw the misleading advertisements GM was planning to make in advance, and did not object, despite having ample opportunity to object.

Indeed, Treasury Secretary Geithner issued a statement at the start of GM’s ad campaign, trumpeting its misleading claims, crowing that “GM had repaid in full the $4.7 billion balance it owed under the government’s Trouble Asset Relief Program.” But this so-called “repayment” was just a deceptive accounting trick. GM used government bailout money to make the “repayment.” As the Washington Examiner noted, Geithner was endorsing a “blatant misrepresentation.”

More importantly, this so-called “repayment” was just a drop in the bucket compared to what GM has received from taxpayers. The federal government had yet to recover the lion’s share of the more than $50 billion it loaned the company. Why? Because that $50 billion was mostly “converted into stock held by the Treasury Department” – stock worth far less than the billions the federal government injected into the company.

These claims were deeply misleading, as Senator Charles Grassley and the government’s own TARP Inspector General noted. GM’s statement that “We have repaid our government loans in full, with interest” was misleading,“according to Neil Barofsky, inspector general for the Troubled Asset Relief Program . . . ‘the source of funds for these quality [debt] payments will be other TARP funds currently held in an escrow account.” Senator Grassley noted that “‘TARP loans were not repaid from money GM is earning selling cars, as GM and the administration have claimed in their speeches, press releases and television commercials.’”

Eventually, financial reporters for newspapers like the New York Times and San Francisco Chronicle ridiculed these false claims. Gretchen Morgenson of the Times pointed out that “the company simply used other funds held by the Treasury to pay off its original loan.” Kathleen Pender of the Chronicle noted that “GM repaid its government loan with other government money.” The Washington Times observed that “General Motors Lost $3.4 billion” just before running the ad; “GM specifically used funds it received from the Troubled Asset Relief Program to pay off the government loan.”

Only after the falsity of GM’s claims became obvious to the general public did some Administration officials distance themselves from them. An April 29 email shows Treasury trying to “prepare a response today” to escalating criticism. (See pg. 11) On May 10, 2010, former auto czar Steve Rattner publicly admitted that “GM may have slightly elasticized the reality of things” in its claims of repayment. Treasury officials privately began to look for ways to respond to this reality. Rattner’s successor, Ron Bloom, wanted “a couple bullet points… for response if this comes up.” (See pp. 61-62.)

The Treasury Department’s role in facilitating GM’s deception may be far greater than the documents reveal, because the Treasury Department withheld some of the documents covered by the FOIA request, including portions of documents shedding light on White House involvement. For example, a blacked out item in the Treasury document release is a March 30 email from Brian Deese in the Executive Office regarding GM’s upcoming campaign. All of its content was blacked out except for the opening words, “Hi guys.” (See pages 58-59)

The Treasury Department waited until after the automakers’ finances had temporarily improved to produce the documents. GM’s finances have been temporarily propped up by the Japanese earthquake and tsunami that ravaged Toyota, and by earlier erroneous claims that Toyota’s automobiles were unsafe. Its profits have also been artificially puffed up by massive deferral of billions of dollars in growing UAW pension obligations. Moreover, as Conn Carroll notes in the Washington Examiner, Chrysler recent auto bailout pay back is in large measure fake.

As journalist Mickey Kaus has noted, “Sales and prices are up recently in part only because competing Japanese car suppliers have been crippled by the earthquake and tsunami. GM’s stock fell today and is still below the initial IPO price.”

Before that, GM’s finances were temporarily buoyed by bad PR regarding Toyota’s alleged safety defects in its cars, which turned out to be largely bogus. (The Toyota crashes turned out to have been caused by driver error, not manufacturing defects).

These things temporarily drove buyers away from Toyota to GM and Chrysler, artificially pumping up their profits. But massive earthquakes and Tsunamis like the one that hit Japan occur there only once or twice a century, and can’t keep GM going in the long run: “Car sales sputtered in May, slumping to levels that were much lower than expected as higher vehicle prices led consumers to put off purchases in the face of a weakening economy. Tightening supplies of vehicles after the Japan earthquake emboldened many companies . . . to raise car and truck prices, a strategy that analysts and investors said had backfired. U.S. automakers” like GM “reported sales on Wednesday that fell short of expectations as the industry experienced its lowest sales rate in eight months.”

GM stock is worth money partly because its government ownership stake allows it to claim up to $45 billion in tax savings that it would otherwise have had to forfeit as a result of its bankruptcy. GM is also receiving lots of taxpayer subsidies for its Chevy Volt, despite revelations that it lied about that car, which it was trumpeting in a “publicity stunt” to curry favor with politicians crusading against global warming.

GM still owes taxpayers at least $29.4 billion, and its finance arm, GMAC, owes taxpayers billions more. In a sense, taxpayers lost money on the sale of some of the government’s shares in General Motors in a 2010 IPO that was touted by government officials. (They got at least $9 billion less for the stock that was sold in the IPO than taxpayers originally paid for that stock.)

Even Kaus, who grudgingly supported the bailouts, thinks that people who bought GM stock were “suckers,” since GM faces hidden perils, still has too much red tape and inefficiency, lacks “effective internal controls,” and is the beneficiary of accounting gimmicks and unrealistic assumptions about its future market share.

In addition to the $50 billion, GM received billions in additional handouts through programs like the extraordinarily wasteful Cash for Clunkers (which cost taxpayers and used-car and car-parts businesses billions), and $17 billion given to its finance arm, GMAC.

GM might never have needed a bailout if it had just received relief from harmful regulations such as CAFE rules (which wipe out at least 50,000 jobs). It might have survived despite GM’s self-inflicted wounds from poor management, excessive wages and gold-plated union benefits (worth up to $70 an hour), and rigid union work rules.

Obama’s car czar left most of those wasteful work rules and excessive benefits intact, and gave the UAW much of General Motors’ stock, even though the UAW helped bankrupt the company, and the company has value today because the taxpayers pumped billions into the company (and engineered the wiping out of General Motors’ bondholders, some of whom were non-union employees who had invested their life savings in the company).

Veteran political commentator Michael Barone called the Obama administration’s treatment of Chrysler and GM bondholders “gangster government.” GMU law professor Todd Zywicki called it an attack on “the rule of law.” Such treatment may well discourage investors from investing in industrial companies in the future, reducing job creation and investment in the American economy.

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Wednesday, June 10, 2009

Swift Overhaul Moves Ahead as Fiat Acquires Chrysler Assets


Matthew Staver/Bloomberg News
Juaquin Rornia carrying out equipment from a closed Chrysler dealership in Castle Rock, Colo.
More Photos »


By MICHAEL J. de la MERCED and MICHELINE MAYNARD
Published: June 10, 2009


With the touch of pen to paper and a simple wire transfer, Chrysler completed its deal with Fiat on Wednesday morning, largely ending its quick trip through bankruptcy.


The last obstacle to an exit — a temporary stay imposed by the Supreme Court — was lifted late Tuesday, after the nine justices declined to hear a challenge of the deal by three Indiana state funds and several consumer groups.


The wire transfer, from the federal government, gives Chrysler $6.6 billion in exit financing.
A two-page order from the Supreme Court made it clear that it was not ruling on the merits of the Indiana funds’ case. But the justices wrote that the funds, which represent teachers and police officers, “have not carried the burden” of proving that the Supreme Court needed to intervene.


After more than a month of sometimes dramatic court hearings, Chrysler sold the bulk of its assets to Fiat in almost anticlimactic fashion: in the offices of the Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, the law firm that is advising the Treasury Department’s auto task force. The sale was completed at about 9 a.m.


“This morning’s closing represents a proud moment in Chrysler’s storied history,” a Treasury official said. “The Chrysler-Fiat alliance has now exited the bankruptcy process and is poised to emerge as a competitive, viable automaker.”


The speed with which Chrysler’s restructuring plan swept through the court system was an important victory for the Obama administration, which is seeking to remake the American auto industry after years of declining sales. When Chrysler filed for bankruptcy on April 30, President Obama promised its restructuring would be “efficient” and “controlled.” Company and government officials repeatedly exhorted the courts to approve the restructuring swiftly, citing the $100 million a day that Chrysler was consuming as it idled its plants and paid other overhead costs.


Chrysler was openly acknowledged as a test case for General Motors, a far larger and more complex company only in the early stages of its bankruptcy case.
As envisioned by Chrysler, Fiat and the government, Wednesday’s sale will create a new carmaker freed from old Chrysler’s crushing labor costs and debt levels. It will have gained in Fiat, which will run the company, a partner skilled in making and selling small, fuel-efficient cars around the world.


Under the plan, the carmaker would emerge from bankruptcy with a union retiree trust owning 55 percent, Fiat owning a 20 percent share that could eventually grow to 35 percent, and the United States and Canadian governments holding minority stakes.
But the hardest part for Chrysler begins now. Stung by the recession, Americans have shown relatively little appetite for buying new cars.


Chrysler has been hit hardest among the three Detroit companies by the slump which began last year and which has resulted in the worst sales in more than a quarter century.
Through May, Chrysler sales were down 46.3 percent, and it held just 10 percent of the car and truck market, down from nearly 15 percent a few years ago. It ranks only fifth in the American market, behind G.M., Toyota, Ford and Honda.


Chrysler employees, who were once considered among the industry’s most energetic and innovative, now face the prospect of adjusting to their third set of owners in less than two years. In recent weeks, teams from Fiat have been going over the company’s operations in Auburn Hills, Mich., much as teams from Cerberus Capital Management did in 2007, when the investment group bought the company from DaimlerChrysler.


Likewise, employees can expect new management at Chrysler, much as Cerberus brought in Robert L. Nardelli, the former Home Depot chief executive, and James Press from Toyota’s American operations. Sergio Marchionne, the chief executive of Fiat, has said he would run Chrysler, but he, too, is likely to bring in some managers.


The impact on Chrysler’s lineup will take longer to be felt. Chrysler, more than any other American player, depends heavily on Jeeps, minivans and pickups as the bulk of its lineup, even after gas prices rose above $4 last year. Small Fiats are expected to be sold at Chrysler dealers, such as the Fiat 500, the latest version of the perennial Italian favorite. But it could take months or years to adapt them to emissions and safety requirements in the United States.


For the moment, Chrysler dealers will have to rely on many of the same vehicles sold by Chrysler before it entered bankruptcy. And there will be far fewer of those dealers: hundreds closed Tuesday night, and their cars and trucks will be redistributed among remaining showrooms.



Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/business/global/11chrysler.html?_r=1&hp

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P.S. It's a sign of the times for those that have eyes to see; The shelves stripped bare and the last remaining vestiges of the U.S. Manufacturing prowess boldly transferred to the Revived Roman Empire. It wasn't enough to ship all factories, plants, industries to Asia; Now the service jobs are also fleeing to Asia, and the rest of the Third World;

Enjoy the upcoming Independence Day with a Global perspective.

They need the jobs; We have beef, swine and barbecues!

Enjoy your baby back ribs, and pig feet*! * Chief Justice Sonia


Please see previous post of 6/09/09 on supreme court approves Chrysler gift to Fiat:

"Supreme Court Clears Way for Sale of Chrysler to Fiat"

Arsenio.

Tuesday, June 09, 2009

U.S. Supreme Court Clears Way for Sale of Chrysler to Fiat


Breaking News Alert

The New York Times

Tuesday, June 9, 2009 -- 7:32 PM ET-----


Supreme Court Clears Way for Sale of Chrysler to Fiat
The United States Supreme Court declined Tuesday evening tohear a challenge to the Chrysler bankruptcy settlement, a dayafter Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg had granted a stay in thecase. The ruling was a setback to a group of dissidentbondholders and will clear the way for the sale of Chrysler'skey assets to a group led by Fiat.




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P.S.
Fiat S.p.A., an acronym for Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino[3] (English: Italian Automobile Factory of Turin), is an Italian automobile manufacturer, engine manufacturer, financial and industrial group based in Turin in the Piedmont region. Fiat was founded in 1899 by a group of investors including Giovanni Agnelli. Fiat has also manufactured tanks and aircraft.
Fiat Group is the largest vehicle manufacturer in Italy, with a range of cars starting from small Fiat city cars to sports cars made by Ferrari, and vans and trucks ranging from the Ducato to Iveco commercial trucks. Besides Fiat Group Automobiles S.p.A, the Fiat Group automotive companies include Ferrari S.p.A., Iveco S.p.A. and Maserati S.p.A. The Fiat Group Automobiles S.p.A. companies include: Abarth & C. S.p.A., Alfa Romeo Automobiles S.p.A., Fiat Automobiles S.p.A., Fiat Professional and Lancia Automobiles S.p.A.. Ferrari S.p.A. is 85% owned by the Fiat Group, but is run autonomously.
Publishing and communication
Fiat group also owns important editorial brands, like La Stampa (created in 1926 for the famous newspaper), Itedi, and Italiana Edizioni. Some national and local newspapers are owned or otherwise controlled by the different companies. A specialised advertising space reseller is Publikompass, supported by the Consorzio Fiat Media Center.
Fiat is also present in the combat vehicle sector through a consortium between Iveco and OTO Melara, their most notable product being the LAV B1 Centauro.
Potential Takeover of GM Europe
In April and May 2009, the possibility of a take over of GM Europe,
a subsidury of General Motors, was being discussed between the two companies. GM Europe owns Opel/Vauxhall and Saab, and, if the deal is successful, will make Fiat the second largest automobile manufacturer in the world, behind Toyota.
On May 30th, 2009, German officials named [Magna] International, an Austro-Canadian car parts manufacturer, to take over Opel. The Opel/Vauxhall partnership is the largest of GM Europe's operations.[21]
Partnership with Chrysler
On 20 January 2009, Fiat S.p.A. and Chrysler LLC announced that they were going to form a global alliance. Under the terms of the agreement, Fiat would take a 35% stake in Chrysler and gain access to its North American dealer network in exchange for providing Chrysler with the platform to build smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles in the US and reciprocal access to Fiat's global distribution network.[25][26]

The new equity holder would have the option of increasing that to as much as 55%. Fiat, the stronger of the two, would not immediately put cash into Chrysler. Instead it would obtain its stake mainly in exchange for covering the cost of retooling a Chrysler plant to produce one or more Fiat models to be sold in the U.S. Fiat would also provide engine and transmission technology to help Chrysler introduce new, fuel-efficient small cars.
The deal is the latest maneuver by Fiat's chief, Sergio Marchionne, who has pulled the Italian company back from the brink of collapse since taking over in 2004.
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Fiat would not have to pay any money for its 20% of Chrysler. On June 7, 2009, the Indiana State Police Pension Fund, the Indiana Teacher's Retirement Fund, and the state's Major Moves Construction Fund asked the U.S. Supreme Court to delay the sale of Chrysler to Fiat while they challenge the deal. The funds argued that the sale went against U.S. bankruptcy law because it unlawfully rewarded unsecured creditors ahead of secured creditors.[29]. On June 9, 2009, the Supreme Court lifted the temporary hold, clearing the way for Fiat to acquire Chrysler.[30] See Indiana State Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler for more information.
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Sergio Marchionne
Sergio Marchionne (born June 17, 1952 in Chieti, Italy[1]) is a dual nationality Canadian and Italian businessman and has been CEO of the Fiat S.p.A. since June 1, 2004. In January 2006 he was also elected Chairman of the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA).[2] He is the Chairman of SGS and a member of the Board of Directors of UBS. On February 21, 2008, the same board of directors of UBS appointed Marchionne as non-executive vice chairman.[3]
In 2006, he was nominated to be a ""Cavaliere del Lavoro" by Italian President Giorgio Napolitano.[1]
Marchionne, together with Fiat Group Chairman Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, returned Fiat's automobile division (Fiat Group Automobiles S.p.A.) to profitability in 2006.[4] Together, they have been widely credited with the turnaround of the group into one of the fastest growing companies in the auto industry.[5]
Marchionne has stated he is on "the list" for one of the limited run of 500 Alfa Romeo 8C Competizione.[6]
The son of Concezio Marchionne, a Carabiniere originally from the Abruzzese town of Cugnoli, and Maria Zuccon from Carnizza in Istria, Sergio was born in Chieti, Abruzzo. At age 13, Marchionne and his family emigrated to Toronto, Canada where they had relatives. [7] Consequently, he has dual Canadian and Italian citizenship. He is a barrister and solicitor, and Certified General Accountant. He is also a member of the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.[8] His undergraduate studies were completed at the University of Toronto. He went on to earn his Masters in Business Administration (MBA) from the University of Windsor in 1980 and his Bachelor of Laws (LLB) from Osgoode Hall Law School of York University in 1983.[9]
He began his professional career in Canada. From 1983 to 1985 he worked as a chartered accountant and tax specialist for Deloitte & Touche. From 1985 to 1988 he was Group Controller and then Director of Corporate Development at the Lawson Mardon Group in Toronto. In 1989 he moved to Glenex Industries where he worked for two years as Executive Vice President.
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It is announced that when Chrysler emerges from Chapter 11 bankruptcy, (which is estimated to be in June of 2009), Marchionne will replace Robert Nardelli as the company's CEO. [1]
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Robert Nardelli
Robert Louis Nardelli (born May 17, 1948, in Old Forge, Pennsylvania) is the chairman and chief executive officer of Chrysler. He had earlier served in a similar capacity at The Home Depot from December 2000 to January 2007. Prior to that, Nardelli had risen to become one of the top four executives at General Electric. CNBC named Nardelli as one of the "Worst American CEOs of All Time".[1]
He attended Rockford Auburn High School in Rockford, Illinois and received his Bachelor of Science in business from Western Illinois University in Macomb, where he was a member of the Tau Kappa Epsilon fraternity. Nardelli also earned an MBA from the University of Louisville.
...
Home Depot
Nardelli became CEO of Home Depot in December 2000, despite having no retail experience. Using the Six Sigma management strategy also used at GE, he dramatically overhauled the company and replaced its freewheeling entrepreneurial culture. He changed the decentralized management structure, by eliminating and consolidating division executives. He also installed processes and streamlined operations, most notably implementing a computerized automated inventory system and centralizing supply orders at the Atlanta headquarters.
Nardelli was credited with doubling the sales of the chain and improving its competitive position. Revenue increased from $40.57 billion in 2000 to $85.15 billion in 2005, while profit rose from $12.6 billion to $25.8 billion. While this was a slower rate of growth than Home Depot had previously experienced (the company doubled in size every 4 years from 1979 to 2001), it must be noted that the high growth rates were largely due to rapid expansion.[citation needed] As the company was reaching its retail limit in the U.S., Nardelli was brought in to shepherd its transition into a mature business.[citation needed]
Some have criticized him for not maintaining the growth that the company had previously experienced, pointing to his huge salary as a sign that he was actually supposed to bring innovation to the company in order to help it maintain its historical growth. During Nardelli's tenure, Home Depot stock was essentially steady while competitor Lowe's stock doubled, which along with his $240 million compensation eventually earned the ire of investors.[2] His blunt, critical and autocratic management style turned off employees and the public. While the board strongly stood by him for most of his tenure, questions about his leadership mounted in 2006, and in an ominous portent of the near future, he was the only director present at the annual meeting; he only allowed shareholders to speak for a minute each.[3] When the board reportedly ousted him in January 2007,[4] Nardelli's severance package was estimated at $210 million. He was succeeded by The Home Depot vice chairman and executive vice president, Frank Blake. Blake had served as Nardelli's deputy at both GE Power Systems and Home Depot.
During his tenure at Home Depot, Nardelli met President George W. Bush at the White House in 2002 and was appointed to Bush's Council on Service and Civic Participation (although he is no longer a member).[5] Nardelli also hosted a garden reception/fundraiser for Bush at his Atlanta home on May 20, 2004[6]

Coca-Cola
While CEO of Home Depot, Nardelli was also briefly on the Board of Directors for Coca-Cola, starting in 2001.
Chrysler
On August 5, 2007, he became chairman and CEO of the newly privatized Chrysler. His current annual salary at Chrysler is $1, with other compensation not publicly disclosed.[7]
On February 17, 2008, before his first Daytona 500 race as Chrysler CEO, Nardelli guaranteed that Dodge would win the race for the first time since 2002, and that he would award a $1 million bonus to the Dodge team that did it. Ryan Newman, the driver of the #12 Alltel Dodge, fulfilled this promise, and his car owner Roger Penske collected the $1 million bounty.[8]
On December 4, 2008, in an appearance on CNN's Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, when asked "So what do you say about the argument that the Japanese, the Germans, Koreans make better cars than the Americans?" Nardelli responded, "We spent about half a billion dollars in the first several months. Our warranty costs are down 29%. It's an interesting comparison because in the hearing today, going around the panel, the majority of the Senators said that citing specific vehicles that they own that they've got 60, 70, 80,000 miles. The comment was you guys are making them too good and therefore, we're not buying vehicles and we're contributing to your problem. That was from the Senators on the committee today. On April 30, 2009 Bob Nardelli announced that he would leave the company as soon as the bankruptcy was over."[9]
On March 17, 2009, Nardelli said that Chrysler Financial would require a second round of loans.[10] On April 21, 2009, it was revealed that a $750 million loan from the government was turned down, on the grounds that it would have required that executive compensation be capped.[11] On April 30, 2009, Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and it was announced that Nardelli's replacement (Sergio Marchionne [12]) would likely face a pay cap.[13]
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P.S. II:
Tutti bene; Finito, Capite?
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Arsenio!
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Wednesday, May 06, 2009

The Impact Of Chrysler's Bankruptcy

Doctor Doom
The Impact Of Chrysler's Bankruptcy
Nouriel Roubini, 05.07.09, 12:01 AM EDT
Lessons for GM--and for the rest of us.


On April 30, Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection from its current creditors. As such, Chrysler will be able to operate as a going concern, while the company renegotiates its debt structure and other obligations. The U.S. government has described Chrysler's action as a "prepackaged surgical bankruptcy," through which it hopes the company will be able to exit the bankruptcy process within 30 to 60 days.

If Chrysler achieves this, it will emerge with a new global partnership with the Italy-based Fiat ( FIA - news - people ). Instead of cash, Fiat will provide the equivalent of billions of dollars in research- and investment-related (R&D) investments for a 35% stake in the new Chrysler. However, many experts think a quick trip into (and out of) bankruptcy might be unrealistic.


In the administration's view, cost cuts--implemented by Cerberus and the new management brought in by Bob Nardelli, who cut into Chrysler's R&D budget and new product development--left Chrysler, the smallest of the Detroit automakers, with a very thin line up of new vehicles.

The Obama administration set partnering with Fiat as a precondition for any further government assistance. Nevertheless, Chrysler was unable to avoid the bankruptcy process, because some creditors balked at the terms being offered in the proposed debt-to-equity swap by the government.

Fiat is vying to get a 35% stake in Chrysler without paying anything for it. What it brings to the table is billions of dollars in R&D that have positioned it well to produce new cars in the future.

Fiat exited the U.S. market decades ago. The marriage between Fiat and Chrysler is based on harsh realities, as evidenced by continuing layoffs in Chrysler's bloated U.S. and Canadian operations, but it seems to be a symbiotic relationship, aimed to help both car makers survive the new tests of an even more competitive landscape. Moreover, it is a reflection of the considerable overcapacities in the global auto sector which may require further consolidation in several national and international markets.

The short-term outcome of Chrysler's bankruptcy filing may come to determine the path for General Motors ( GM - news - people ), if not the entire U.S. auto industry. If bankruptcy proceedings for Chrysler go as the company and the U.S. government have planned, Chrysler's filing may very well turn out to be just a test case before the bankruptcy filing of GM itself.

GM has until the end of May to convince the government it has a viable business plan for restructuring outside a Chapter 11 reorganization. If it fails to renegotiate its debt and convince its current creditors to undergo a debt-for-equity swap--as Chrysler failed to do--then GM will have no option but to file for Chapter 11 protection.

GM's new chief executive, Fritz Henderson, has vowed to do whatever is reasonably necessary to prevent the automaker from going under, including seeking loan packages from U.S., Canadian and European governments (particularly Germany). But GM can no longer afford its extensive European operations and is in the process of looking for bidders.

The significant roles the auto sector plays in employment, exports and industrial production have heightened the political importance of responding to their vulnerabilities, which have been exacerbated by the credit crunch, prompting rescue packages including bridge loans, incentives to purchase domestic vehicles and increases in tariffs on imported cars and auto parts. In the face of rising unemployment in other sectors, governments hope to avoid any disorderly bankruptcy proceedings.

Furthermore, the Chrysler-Fiat merger could set off a chain of consolidations within the auto sector, which continues to have significant production overcapacities. Even emerging economies are likely to contribute slower auto demand growth in coming years. In Russia, automakers, including Toyota ( TM - news - people ), have repeatedly shuttered production, and domestic automakers are now increasing car loans in order to encourage purchases.

Other countries, such as China, also face the near-term challenge of consolidating their many automakers into several companies large enough to take advantage of economies of scale, increasing their share of the domestic market, and possibly expanding abroad.

Fiat is also trying to position itself to obtain an ownership stake in GM's European affiliate, Opel. The plan, which includes the other GM subsidiaries in Europe--Vauxhall in Britain and Saab in Sweden, would create a new global auto company with annual sales of up to 7 million cars and 80 billion euros (106 billion U.S. dollars) in revenues, which would secure Fiat a winning position in the post-crisis market.

The move, however, is likely to face political hurdles, as neither the German nor Italian governments would like to deal with the job losses (an estimated 8,000 to 9,000 jobs) likely from such a merger, particularly not in an election year (Germans vote this fall).

According to press reports, Berlin issued a list of conditions for Fiat, which includes stating where the headquarters would be located, where the taxes would be paid, the number of expected job losses and the future of Opel plants in Germany. GM, though, has the final say in assessing Fiat's offer. Yet the German economic minister suggested Fiat needs German state credits in lieu of adequate financing, which might increase German government leverage. However, supporting the formation of a global car maker with the German government's credit guarantees may enrage other German car makers, such as the VW Group, BMW and Mercedes-Benz.

The pressure on domestic jobs has increased the political importance of responding to the automakers' woes in many countries. In February, France raised protectionist fears after introducing state aid for the domestic car makers in return for an unwritten pledge to keep jobs and production at home. It posed a test for the EU's single-market rules and triggered an angry response from the Eastern European countries that would be hurt the most by the measure. Other countries, like Argentina and Russia, have increased restrictions on auto or parts imports in an attempt to support domestic industries. These might actually have the opposite effect--those in Russia hurt the business of used-car sellers.

But some government attempts to stoke auto demand may well erode future demand. So-called "cash-for-clunkers" deals--in which governments provide incentives for consumers to trade in their old cars for new (and often more fuel-efficient) ones--have had the desired effect, boosting auto sales in countries like Germany and China for the types of cars targeted.

These measures are helping to erode the inventory of manufacturers in a relatively orderly manner, but may be deferring the adjustment process the automakers will later face. Moreover, rising unemployment is likely to weigh on consumption, especially for large, credit-dependent purchases like cars.

The bankruptcy also has significant repercussions on the corporate bond market. Chrysler's bankruptcy filing was preceded by tough negotiations among creditors and the government to conclude an out-of-court restructuring in which lenders would receive 29 cents on the dollar in cash in exchange for wiping out about $6.9 billion of Chrysler's debt.

A group of about 20 secured creditors refused to sign off on the deal, arguing that their stakes were worth more and demanding that their seniority rights be observed. However, recent empirical evidence shows that as default rates increase, recovery rates are falling fast in this cycle. Moody's ( MCO - news - people ) reported that in the past seven months, completed CDS auctions resulted in a recovery rate of 30 cents on the dollar for loans and about 15 cents on the dollar for bonds, compared with 85 cents and 70 cents on the dollar, respectively, for all of 2008.

The latest research by Edward Altman yields similar results, stressing that distressed exchanges to avoid bankruptcy have surged since 2008, and that they usually yield significantly higher recovery rates to participating bondholders. In fact, S&P warns that, due to loose covenants and missing early-warning triggers, the losses even for secured creditors in this cycle might turn out to be substantial if a company cannot reorganize and liquidate.

Henry Hu of Texas University points to the "empty creditor" phenomenon to explain why some lenders prefer to hold out and force a bankruptcy seemingly against the company's--and thus their own--best interests. In short, creditors with enough credit default swaps may simultaneously have control rights and incentives to cause the debtor firm's value to fall. And if bankruptcy occurs, the empty creditor may undermine proper reorganization, especially if his interests (or non-interests) are not fully disclosed to the bankruptcy court.

But are credit markets finally thawing? Indeed, corporate bond issuance has picked up substantially since December, especially in the high-yield segment amid tighter spreads since the immediate Lehman aftermath. On a more cautious note, the IMF notes that, given shortening credit lines and still tight bank lending standards (confirmed in the April Bank Loan Officer Survey), corporations are taking advantage of this window of opportunity to refinance themselves in the bond market, despite substantially higher costs.

An additional factor fueling this front-loaded corporate bond activity is the likely future crowding-out by sovereign and government guaranteed debt. While the high-yield segment has returned 17.4% year-to-date in 2009, the fates of Chrysler and GM show the default rate may not yet have reached its peak.

Nouriel Roubini, a professor at New York University's Stern Business School and chairman of Roubini Global Economics, is a weekly columnist for Forbes. Analysts at Roubini Global Economics assisted in the research and writing of this piece.


Source:http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/06/chrysler-gm-fiat-bankruptcy-opinions-columnists-nouriel-roubini.html

P.S.My question to Professor Roubini is why is the White House micro-managing and giving it's blessing to this Fiat-Chrysler consolidation?

I pose that question to anyone: Why is there such an obssession with a merger with a foreign company, of the Italian persuasion?

Che Fai?

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Monday, April 13, 2009

Midwest auto industry: Tough times ahead for towns across region


Automakers restructuring and business contracting

By Tim Jones Tribune correspondent
April 12, 2009


In tattered and gray industrial towns across the Midwest, no one knows exactly where the ax will swing next. But there is no doubt the forced downsizing of General Motors and Chrysler, which will begin to take shape in the coming weeks, will fundamentally change the quality of life in communities and the region for years to come.

Even if both automakers survive, economists say, they will be smaller and will pay lower wages and benefits. More communities will lose production and parts plants, and the states that have relied heavily on those manufacturing jobs—especially Michigan, Indiana and Ohio — will take a big hit that, economists warn, will take years and perhaps decades to overcome.

"If you go back to 1980 to 1982, with the upheavals in the steel, rubber, glass and auto industries, that really was the end of an economic era that started in the 1890s," said Ned Hill, an economist at Cleveland State University. "This is the last movement in the symphony."

While the American auto industry played a large role in creating the modern Midwest a century ago, its unraveling has exposed the region's economic over-reliance on vehicle manufacturing. In recent decades, the demise of specialized manufacturing—shoes in Missouri, TV picture tubes in Indiana and Ohio, glass in Toledo and rubber in Akron—sent many towns and cities reeling from the loss of jobs. On a larger scale, Chicago, northwest Indiana and northeast Ohio suffered from Big Steel's slide more than 25 years ago.


But the auto industry has a much broader footprint in the region, with about two dozen assembly plants of General Motors, Chrysler and Ford in the Midwest and many hundreds of parts suppliers peppered about, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

"Every job in the auto industry usually can be responsible for five to six jobs in general throughout the entire economy," said Jerry Conover, director of the Indiana Business Research Center at Indiana University. "The direct and indirect effect of all of this means a lot less money circulating through the cash registers in these states."

The details of the downsizing are being discussed as GM faces a deadline at the end of May to satisfy the government's requirements for federal assistance. Chrysler has until the end of April to work out a merger deal with Italian carmaker Fiat. Those private discussions have fed rumors of plant closings around the Midwest and across the nation. Bankruptcy is an option for both automakers.

How bad would it be if one or more of the Detroit automakers failed? In perhaps the most dire forecast, the Center for Automotive Research in Ann Arbor, Mich., said the 2009 job loss would be nearly 2.5 million if there were a 50 percent cut in operations at the Big Three. Personal income would drop by $276 billion, the report forecast.

That, Hill noted, assumes the lost auto production would not be picked up by other automakers, including Honda and Toyota, which have production facilities in the Midwest. Still, even under less pessimistic projections, pain will be spread around the region as jobs are slashed and pay, health-care and retirement benefits are scaled back, Hill predicted.

"The unfortunate thing is you've got a large number of small- to mid-size communities dependent on this income," Hill said. "What's happening now will put the industrial Midwest at a bigger disadvantage."

The domestic auto industry has been shrinking since the 1980s, and some of the cities affected by that decline provide a bleak view of what may be in store for others as the industry continues to contract. For generations, Anderson, Ind., was a major parts supplier for GM, but most of those operations have been gradually shut down over the past 25 years. Anderson, which has struggled to regain its economic footing, is defined by a disproportionate number of senior residents, steady job losses and wages at less than 75 percent of the U.S. average, according to a report from STATS Indiana.

In nearby Muncie, Ind., another city that supplied GM, the last of the major suppliers is scheduled to complete its shutdown later this year. The average wage has dropped in Muncie, which is making a painful transition from a well-paying manufacturing economy to one dominated by health care and Ball State University.

"It takes decades to make the adjustment," said Roy Budd, executive director of Energize-East Central Indiana, a non-profit economic development group. "I think we've trough-ed out and are on the upswing. But it takes a lot of time. We didn't get into it overnight and won't get out of it overnight."

The economic crisis has made Michigan, once one of the more prosperous states, a net population loser, with 109,000 more people moving out last year than moved in, according to census data. Among the obstacles for the region to recover, Conover said, is the relatively low percentage of college graduates in these states. The national average of people with a bachelor's degree or more is 27.5 percent, according to the Census Bureau. The percentages in Michigan, Ohio and Indiana are 24.7, 24.1 and 22.1, respectively.

The questions of how, and indeed whether, GM and Chrysler survive will begin to be answered in a few weeks, and then any affected communities will begin the adjustment to life without their biggest breadwinner.

"This is pretty devastating stuff," Hill said. "It takes almost 20 years to rebuild your economy, and usually you waste five to six years because of denial."

tmjones@tribune.com




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