The National Airspace System and its Design and Implementation Pre 9/11: Did the 9/11 Commission Ignore the Real Facts and Circumstances?
9/11: The Unanswered Questions
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Ramesh S Arunachalam
On 9/11, communication emanating from the FAA to NORAD, NORAD to FAA as well as other stakeholders (like the White House) was, at best, reported as ineffective, inaccurate and even confusing. If communication was sub-optimal and has been blamed for much of the systemic failure on that fateful day, then it is only fair to look at systems related to communication to fix responsibility and accountability for the 9/11 crime. This becomes even more important when one considers the fact that no less a person than the 9/11 Commission vice-chair, Lee Hamilton (along with Daniel Marcus, the General Counsel of the 9/11 Commission) acknowledged that there were not only confusing and inaccurate aspects but also several gaps in communication on 9/11.
What are these systems related to communication, especially at the FAA with regard to the 9/11 crime? All information systems across the FAA—that were collectively called the National Airspace System (NAS)—comprise the primary communication system that needed to be analyzed for failure on 9/11. The NAS may be viewed as an information system of systems that collectively supports all air operations in the US and related oceanic areas. Viewed in this light, the NAS can be divided conceptually into three parts:
Sources of information necessary to perform air operations,
Users, who use the information to perform air operations and who, in the course of performing them, produce additional information, and
Access and management of the information between sources and users.
It is apparent that significant US taxpayer dollars were invested in the design of FAA’s NAS that failed so miserably in protecting airspace, life, and assets on 9/11. Yet, you will be shocked to know that the NAS is mentioned just once in the 9/11 Commission’s final report. Page 16 of the 9/11 Commission report[i] notes:
“FAA headquarters is ultimately responsible for the management of the National Airspace System.”
That is all there is on the NAS in the entire 9/11 Commission report and that is puzzling. Why did the 9/11 Commission—which acknowledged poor, inaccurate, and confusing communication on 9/11— not pursue and conduct a thorough investigation of the NAS which is widely acknowledged to have failed that fateful day?
The first question they should have asked here was who designed this ‘ineffective’ NAS that failed and caused large scale devastation? That was very, very important. For any criminal investigation this would have been important and I am simply amazed that the 9/11 Commission failed to even look at the antecedents of the NAS, including aspects of who had designed this.
From a criminal procedural standpoint, understanding why the NAS failed was very important. And for that, one needed to know the stakeholders who designed and implemented the NAS, their antecedents (including security clearances), their access to FAA’s NAS on 9/11 and, also, most importantly, what exactly these stakeholders were doing on 9/11. That is a starter’s imperative for any criminal investigation of the 9/11 event and ought to have been done, but was not pursued by the 9/11 Commission as part of its wide ranging mandate. This is to set the record straight.
Three key questions are of relevance at this juncture:
Who (which stakeholders) developed the blueprint for the design of FAA’s National Airspace System (NAS) prior to 9/11?
Who (which stakeholders) actually designed and implemented the NAS for the FAA, prior to 9/11?
Was this exercise ongoing prior to and during 9/11 as well?