Showing posts with label Web. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Web. Show all posts

Thursday, November 13, 2025

LIVE: Winter Garden, Florida Webcam (sponsored by AdventHealth)


🔴LIVE: Winter Garden, Florida Webcam

Started streaming on Aug 29, 2025 WINTER GARDEN

Welcome to downtown Winter Garden, Florida. The webcam looks west toward the clock tower on Plant Street from the Winter Garden Heritage Museum, operated by the Winter Garden Heritage Foundation. 

Downtown Winter Garden is home to dozens of locally-owned shops and restaurants, along with the Winter Garden Heritage Museum and the Central Florida Railroad Museum. The Winter Garden Farmer's Market opens every Saturday from 8:00am until 1:00pm. 

Learn more about the Winter Garden Heritage Foundation including upcoming programs and events by visiting: https://www.wghf.org 

The webcam is sponsored by AdventHealth. https://www.adventhealth.com 
We appreciate their support of the Winter Garden Heritage Foundation. 

The camera view changes hourly to one of three preset positions. Audio is muted. 

The live stream started on February 11, 2021 with a camera upgrade on August 19, 2025. The stream is maintained by Orlando Corporate Media: https://www.orlandowebcasts.com


Sunday, August 18, 2024

Thursday, September 29, 2016

Meet the New Authoritarian Masters of the Internet




Getty Images

by John Hayward
29 Sep 2016886




President Barack Obama’s drive to hand off control of Internet domains to a foreign multi-national operation will give some very unpleasant regimes equal say over the future of online speech and commerce.

In fact, they are likely to have much more influence than America, because they will collectively push hard for a more tightly controlled Internet, and they are known for aggressively using political and economic pressure to get what they want.

Here’s a look at some of the regimes that will begin shaping the future of the Internet in just a few days, if President Obama gets his way.

China

China wrote the book on authoritarian control of online speech. The legendary “Great Firewall of China” prevents citizens of the communist state from accessing global content the Politburo disapproves of. Chinese technology companies are required by law to provide the regime with backdoor access to just about everything.

The Chinese government outright banned online news reporting in July, granting the government even tighter control over the spread of information. Websites are only permitted to post news from official government sources. Chinese online news wasn’t exactly a bastion of freedom before that, of course, but at least the government censors had to track down news stories they disliked and demand the site administrators take them down.

Unsurprisingly, the Chinese Communists aren’t big fans of independent news analysis or blogging, either. Bloggers who criticize the government are liable to be charged with “inciting subversion,” even when the writer in question is a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Chinese citizens know better than to get cheeky on social media accounts, as well. Before online news websites were totally banned, they were forbidden from reporting news gathered from social media, without government approval. Spreading anything the government decides is “fake news” is a crime.

In a report labeling China one of the worst countries for Internet freedom in the world, Freedom House noted they’ve already been playing games with Internet registration and security verification:


The China Internet Network Information Center was found to be issuing false digital security certificates for a number of websites, including Google, exposing the sites’ users to “man in the middle” attacks.

The government strengthened its real-name registration laws for blogs, instant-messaging services, discussion forums, and comment sections of websites.

A key feature of China’s online censorship is that frightened citizens are not entirely certain what the rules are. Huge ministries work tirelessly to pump out content regulations and punish infractions. Not all of the rules are actually written down. As Foreign Policy explained:


Before posting, a Chinese web user is likely to consider basic questions about how likely a post is to travel, whether it runs counter to government priorities, and whether it calls for action or is likely to engender it. Those answers help determine whether a post can be published without incident — as it is somewhere around 84 percent or 87 percent of the time — or is instead likely to lead to a spectrum of negative consequences varying from censorship, to the deletion of a user’s account, to his or her detention, even arrest and conviction.

This was accompanied by a flowchart demonstrating “what gets you censored on the Chinese Internet.” It is not a simple flowchart.

Beijing is not even slightly self-conscious about its authoritarian control of the Internet. On the contrary, their censorship policies are trumpeted as “Internet sovereignty,” and they aggressively believe the entire world should follow their model, as the Washington Post reported in a May 2016 article entitled “China’s Scary Lesson to the World: Censoring the Internet Works.”

China already has a quarter of the planet’s Internet users locked up behind the Great Firewall. How can anyone doubt they won’t use the opportunity Obama is giving them, to pursue their openly stated desire to lock down the rest of the world?

Russia

Russia and China are already working together for a more heavily-censored Internet. Foreign Policy reported one of Russia’s main goals at an April forum was to “harness Chinese expertise in Internet management to gain further control over Russia’s internet, including foreign sites accessible there.”

Russia’s “top cop,” Alexander Bastrykin, explicitly stated Russia needs to stop “playing false democracy” and abandon “pseudo-liberal values” by following China’s lead on Internet censorship, instead of emulating the U.S. example. Like China’s censors, Russian authoritarians think “Internet freedom” is just coded language for the West imposing “cultural hegemony” on the rest of the world.

Just think what Russia and China will be able to do about troublesome foreign websites, once Obama surrenders American control of Internet domains!

Russian President Vladimir Putin has “chipped away at Internet freedom in Russia since he returned to the Kremlin in 2012,” as International Business Times put it in a 2014 article.

One of Putin’s new laws requires bloggers with over 3,000 readers to register with the government, providing their names and home addresses. As with China, Russia punishes online writers for “spreading false information,” and once the charge is leveled, it’s basically guilty-until-proven-innocent. For example, one of the “crimes” that can get a blogger prosecuted in Russia is alleging the corruption of a public official, without ironclad proof.

Human-rights group Agora estimates that Russian Internet censorship grew by 900% in 2015 alone, including both court orders and edicts from government agencies that don’t require court approval. Censorship was expected to intensify even further throughout 2016. Penalties include prison time, even for the crime of liking or sharing banned content on social media.

Putin, incidentally, has described the entire Internet as a CIA plot designed to subvert regimes like his. There will be quite a few people involved in the new multi-national Internet control agency who think purging the Web of American influence is a top priority.

The Russian government has prevailed upon Internet Service Providers to block opposition websites during times of political unrest, in addition to thousands of bans ostensibly issued for security, crime-fighting, and anti-pornography purposes.

Many governments follow the lead of Russia and China in asserting the right to shut down “extremist” or “subversive” websites. In the United States, we worry about law enforcement abusing its authority while battling outright terrorism online, arguing that privacy and freedom of speech must always be measured against security, no matter how dire the threat. In Russia, a rough majority of the population has no problem with the notion of censoring the Internet in the name of political stability, and will countenance absolutely draconian controls against perceived national security threats. This is a distressingly common view in other nations as well: stability justifies censorship and monitoring, not just physical security.

Turkey

Turkey’s crackdown on the Internet was alarming even before the aborted July coup attempt against authoritarian President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Turkey has banned social media sites, including temporary bans against even giants like Facebook and YouTube, for political reasons. Turkish dissidents are accustomed to such bans coming down on the eve of elections. The Turkish telecom authority can impose such bans without a court order, or a warning to offending websites.

Turkey is often seen as the world leader in blocking Twitter accounts, in addition to occasionally shutting the social media service down completely, and has over a 100,000 websites blacklisted. Criticizing the government online can result in anything from lost employment to criminal charges. And if you think social-media harassment from loyal supporters of the government in power can get pretty bad in the U.S., Turks sometimes discover that hassles from pro-regime trolls online are followed by visits from the police.

Turkish law infamously makes it a crime to insult the president, a law Erdogan has already attempted to impose beyond Turkey’s borders. One offender found himself hauled into court for creating a viral meme – the sort of thing manufactured by the thousands every hour in America – that noted Erdogan bore a certain resemblance to Gollum from Lord of the Rings. The judge in his case ordered expert testimony on whether Gollum was evil to conclusively determine whether the meme was an illegal insult to the president.

The Turkish example introduces another idea common to far too many of the countries Obama wants to give equal say over the future of the Internet: intimidation is a valid purpose for law enforcement. Many of Turkey’s censorship laws are understood to be mechanisms for intimidating dissidents, raising the cost of free speech enough to make people watch their words very carefully. “Think twice before you Tweet” might be good advice for some users, but regimes like Erdogan’s seek to impose that philosophy on everyone. This runs strongly contrary to the American understanding of the Internet as a powerful instrument that lowers the cost of speech to near-zero, the biggest quantum leap for free expression in human history. Zero-cost speech is seen as a big problem by many of the governments that will now place strong hands upon the global Internet rudder.

Turkey is very worried about “back doors” that allow citizens to circumvent official censorship, a concern they will likely bring to Internet control, along with like-minded authoritarian regimes. These governments will make the case that a free and open Internet is a direct threat to their “sovereign right” to control what their citizens read. As long as any part of the Internet remains completely free, no sector can be completely controlled.

Saudi Arabia

The Saudis aren’t too far behind China in the Internet rankings by Freedom House. Dissident online activity can bring jail sentences, plus the occasional public flogging.

This is particularly lamentable because Saudi Arabia is keenly interested in modernization, and sees the Internet as a valuable economic resource, along with a thriving social media presence. Freedom House notes the Internet “remains the least repressive space for expression in the country,” but “it is by no means free.”

“While the state focuses on combatting violent extremism and disrupting terrorist networks, it has clamped down on nonviolent liberal activists and human rights defenders with the same zeal, branding them a threat to the national order and prosecuting them in special terrorism tribunals,” Freedom House notes.

USA Today noted that as of 2014, Saudi Arabia had about 400,000 websites blocked, “including any that discuss political, social or religious topics incompatible with the Islamic beliefs of the monarchy.”

At one point the blacklist included the Huffington Post, which was banned for having the temerity to run an article suggesting the Saudi system might “implode” because of oil dependency and political repression. The best response to criticism that your government is too repressive is a blacklist!

The Saudis have a penchant for blocking messaging apps and voice-over-IP services, like Skype and Facetime. App blocking got so bad that Saudi users have been known to ask, “What’s the point of having the Internet?”

While some Saudis grumble about censorship, many others are active, enthusiastic participants in enforcement, filing hundreds of requests each day to have websites blocked. Religious figures supply many of these requests, and the government defends much of its censorship as the defense of Islamic values.

As with other censorious regimes, the Saudi monarchy worries about citizens using web services beyond its control to evade censorship, a concern that will surely be expressed loudly once America surrenders its command of Internet domains.

For the record, the Saudis’ rivals in Iran are heavy Internet censors too, with Stratfor listing them as one of the countries seeking Chinese assistance for “solutions on how best to monitor the Iranian population.”

North Korea

You can’t make a list of authoritarian nightmares without including the psychotic regime in Pyongyang, the most secretive government in the world.

North Korea is so repressive the BBC justly puts the word “Internet” in scare quotes, to describe the online environment. It doesn’t really interconnect with anything, except government propaganda and surveillance. Computers in the lone Internet cafe in Pyongyang actually boot up to a customized Linux operating system called “Red Star,” instead of Windows or Mac OS. The calendar software in Red Star measures the date from the birth of Communist founder Kim Il-sung, rather than the birth of Christ.

The “Internet” itself is a closed system called Kwangmyong, and citizens can only access it through a single state-run provider, with the exception of a few dozen privileged families that can punch into the real Internet.

Kwangmyong is often compared to the closed “intranet” system in a corporate office, with perhaps 5,000 websites available at most. Unsurprisingly, the content is mostly State-monitored messaging and State-supplied media. Contributors to these online services have reportedly been sent to re-education camps for typos. The North Koreans are so worried about outside contamination of their closed network that they banned wi-fi hotspots at foreign embassies, having noticed information-starved North Korean citizens clustering within range of those beautiful, uncensored wireless networks.

This doesn’t stop South Koreans from attempting cultural penetration of their squalid neighbor’s dismal little online network. Lately they’ve been doing it by loading banned information onto cheap memory sticks, tying them to balloons, and floating them across the border.

Sure, North Korea is the ultimate totalitarian nightmare, and since they have less than two thousand IP addresses registered in the entire country, the outlaw regime won’t be a big influence on Obama’s multi-national Internet authority, right?

Not so fast. As North Korea expert Scott Thomas Bruce told the BBC, authoritarian governments who are “looking at what is happening in the Middle East” see North Korea as a model to be emulated.

“They’re saying rather than let in Facebook, and rather than let in Twitter, what if the government created a Facebook that we could monitor and control?” Bruce explained.

Also, North Korea has expressed some interest in using the Internet as a tool for economic development, which means there would be more penetration of the actual global network into their society. They’ll be very interested in censoring and controlling that access, and they’ll need a lot more registered domains and IP addresses… the very resource Obama wants America to surrender control over.

Bottom line: contrary to left-wing cant, there is such a thing as American exceptionalism – areas in which the United States is demonstrably superior to every other nation, a leader to which the entire world should look for examples. Sadly, our society is losing its fervor for free expression, and growing more comfortable with suppressing “unacceptable” speech, but we’re still far better than anyone else in this regard.

The rest of the world, taken in total, is very interested in suppressing various forms of expression, for reasons ranging from security to political stability and religion. Those governments will never be comfortable, so long as parts of the Internet remain outside of their control. They have censorship demands they consider very reasonable, and absolutely vital. The website you are reading right now violates every single one of them, on a regular basis.

There may come a day we can safely remand control of Internet domains to an international body, but that day is most certainly not October 1, 2016.


Source

 

Thursday, June 23, 2016

Taking the pulse of the federal government's web presence




An official website of the U.S. government 




June 2, 2015



by Eric Mill, Julia Elman, Gray Brooks, and John Tindel

The U.S. federal government is launching a new project to monitor how it's doing at best practices on the web.

A sort of health monitor for the U.S. government's websites, it's called Pulse, and you can find it at pulse.cio.gov.



Pulse is a lightweight dashboard that uses the official .gov domain list to measure two things:
Analytics: Whether federal executive branch domains are participating in the Digital Analytics Program that powersanalytics.usa.gov.
HTTPS: Whether federal domains have deployed the HTTPS protocol, and how well they've done it.

These two things are just a start — there are a lot of other important things worth measuring! It's also important to note that Pulse is currently only measuring parent domains (e.g. agency.gov) and is not measuring subdomains (e.g.portal.agency.gov).

The project will hopefully expand over time to measure more best practices and more websites. In the meantime, Pulse is a commitment by the U.S. government to build a world-class analytics program and to transition entirely to HTTPS.
Background



Pulse is a collaboration between 18F and the Office of Government-wide Policy (OGP).

Like 18F, OGP is an office of the U.S. General Services Administration. Among many other things, OGP operates the .gov domain registry and the CIO Council, an interagency forum of Chief Information Officers.

18F previously partnered with OGP in December to release the complete .gov domain list. Since then, 18F has worked with the Digital Analytics Program to build analytics.usa.gov, and has coordinated with a number of agencies to strengthen HTTPS for federal .gov domains. We're deeply gratified that we've had the opportunity to work with OGP to create a platform that continues this momentum.
How pulse.cio.gov works



Pulse was created in around six weeks. We built the project in the open from Day 1, obtained our domain name and relevant cybersecurity approvals in our first couple weeks, and released new versions of the dashboard topulse.cio.gov early and often throughout the process.

We also gathered usability feedback throughout development from users both inside and outside of the government, and repeatedly incorporated the results of that feedback into our work. Even though Pulse is only a handful of pages and puts most of its data into a simple table, we wanted to pay attention to detail and take the same user-centered approach 18F takes with our larger projects.

Pulse is a static website whose data is created from a combination of sources:
The official .gov domain list. This is currently exported manually by GSA staff on a roughly quarterly basis.
The list of websites which participate in the Digital Analytics Program. This is also currently exported manually by GSA staff on a roughly quarterly basis.
Data collected from a public scan of how federal domains respond to HTTP and HTTPS, using an open source tool by Ben Balter called site-inspector.
Data collected from a public scan of HTTPS configuration details for federal domains, using the SSL Labs API.

To coordinate the data collection process, we created domain-scan, a small Python command line tool that runs domains through site-inspectorand the SSL Labs API and produces CSV reports.

We then run these CSVs through a final step, where we take the low-level primitives we gathered during the scanning process and create some higher-level conclusions and save them in a format that Pulse can automatically render into a table.

The process is not fully automated, and so Pulse isn't updated every day. There's work to do on all of the above to get to the point of showing fully up-to-date data without human intervention.
Measuring participation in the Digital Analytics Program



The Digital Analytics Program is a free, shared web analytics service for U.S. federal agencies.

To participate, agencies place some JavaScript on their websites that report to a combined analytics account. The Digital Analytics Program has privacy controls that anonymize visitor addresses and restrict data sharing.

Access to the account is shared within the federal government, and much of its data is shared publicly on analytics.usa.gov. The Digital Analytics Program also regularly publishes a list of around 4,000 participating websites that have reported visitor data in the preceding 2 weeks.



Pulse measures participation in the simplest way possible: by comparing the .gov domain list to the list of participating websites published by the Digital Analytics Program. It's not rocket science, but in the future we'd like to automate this process using theanalytics-reporter tool we created for analytics.usa.gov.
Measuring HTTPS in .gov



Enforcing strong HTTPS is an important baseline for government websites, and is in the process of becoming the baseline for the web at large.

HTTPS is simple enough to detect, but characterizing HTTPS support for a domain, precisely and reliably, is trickier than you might expect.

We lean heavily on the open sourcesite-inspector, a command line tool written in Ruby. site-inspectormeasures various useful things about websites, and was originally written by Ben Balter to analyze .gov domains.



To get the precision we wanted, we needed to take into account several subtle things about domains:
Domains have 4 possible "endpoints" — https://www,https://, http://www, andhttp:// — which may each exhibit very different behavior. Describing a domain's HTTPS support means detecting which endpoint is "canonical," as well as looking holistically at which endpoints redirect to others.
A domain's HTTPS certificate might be issued for an invalid hostname (e.g. a248.e.akamai.net). In this case, HTTPS is likely anunsupported way to access the domain.
A domain's HTTPS certificate might have an incomplete or untrusted chain (e.g. missing intermediates, or a private root certificate), in which case HTTPS is likely asupported way to access the domain.
A domain might set an HSTS policy for www, but neglect to apply one to the bare domain, negating HSTS policy for its other subdomains.
A domain might support HTTPS with a valid certificate, but have a policy of "downgrading" users by redirecting away from HTTPS to HTTP.

We use site-inspector to look at all of the above factors (and many more) and calculate a bunch of helpful things about a domain's HTTPS support. If you really want to dive deeply into the methodology, you can read the original work discussion.

To measure HTTPS quality, we lean onSSL Labs. SSL Labs' grading systemhas become a widely respected, universally referenced gauge of HTTPS quality. (Here's the report for Pulse itself.)

We used ssllabs-scan, an open source client for the SSL Labs API, to collect the top-level grade along with some common relevant issues that are worth addressing (such as forward secrecy, or the use of SHA-1 signatures).
Looking forward

We're still in the process of fully documenting the tools we used. If you're interested in using any of it in your own work, and you have questions about how to get started, ring in on GitHub. We're an open source team, and we'd love your contributions!

Pulse is clearly a small and simple website, but we think it's a promising foundation for celebrating (and motivating) the U.S. government's progress on making world-class websites and online services.

We're thrilled we had the opportunity to work with the Office of Government-wide Policy here at GSA to get Pulse started, and we hope others find it useful. Feel free to leave feedback on the project so far, and where to take Pulse next!

Source

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