Showing posts with label Draghi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Draghi. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

Protester disrupts European Central Bank press conference - as it happened




Mario Draghi’s press conference in Frankfurt briefly suspended after a protester wearing a t-shirt showing “End the ECB dick-tatorship” threw paper and confetti at Europe’s top central banker

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LIVE Updated 4h ago

 

An activist stands on the table of the podium throwing paper at ECB President Mario Draghi, left, during today’s press conference in Frankfurt. Photograph: Michael Probst/AP


Graeme Wearden

Wednesday 15 April 2015 14.07 EDTLast modified on Wednesday 15 April 201514.10 EDT


4h ago14:05
Closing summary: Protests in the heart of the ECB


It’s time for a closing summary.

Mario Draghi’s press conference in Frankfurt was dramatically disrupted today by an activist, in a protest against the European Central Bank’s policies.

In a remarkable security breach the protestor, understood to be Josephine Witt, leapt on the desk, showering glitter on the ECB president.

She also threw leaflets condemning the “undemocratic” Bank, and its role in the financial crisis, and chanted “End the ECB dictatorship” repeatedly, before being removed by security staff.

 

A protester who jumped on top of ECB president Mario Draghi’s desk during a news conference at the European Central Bank is detained by security. Her shirt reads “End the ECB Dick-tatorship”. Photograph: Marcus Golejewski/Demotix/Corbis

And there’s a video clip here.

The press conference was briefly suspended, before Draghi returned to tell reporters that his QE programme was delivering benefits to the eurozone economy, and to call for Europe’s labour market to be reformed to help younger people.

According to the ECB, Ms Witt registered as a journalist to attend today’s press conference in the Bank’s new Frankfurt headquarters. Staff took “immediate and effective action”, it said in a statement.


For example:


Photograph: Marcus Golejewski/Demotix/Corbis

Police confirmed that they arrested a 21-year-old woman at the scene; she was later released:


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Monday, May 12, 2014

Martin Feldstein: A weaker euro for a stronger Europe


Europe's policymakers must intervene to weaken their currency

Martin Feldstein
May 12, 2014 Last Updated at 21:50 IST

Don't Invest in the Euro
The Dollar And Euro Are Doomed. These 3 Currencies Will Take Over. wallstreetdaily.com/Free-





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Despite the recent upturn in some of its member countries, the euro zone's economy remains in the doldrums, with the overall rate of annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth this year likely to be only slightly higher than one per cent. Even Germany's growth rate is below two per cent, while GDP is still declining in France, Italy and Spain. And this slow rate of growth has kept the euro zone's total unemployment rate at a painfully high 12 per cent.

Slow growth and high unemployment are not the euro zone's only problems. The annual inflation rate, at just 0.5 per cent, is now so close to zero that even a minor shock could push it into negative territory and trigger a downward price spiral. Deflation would weaken aggregate demand by raising the real (inflation-adjusted) value of household and corporate debt, and by increasing real interest rates. Lower demand could, in turn, cause the fall in prices to accelerate, sending prices into a dangerous tailspin.

There are few if any panaceas in economics. But a sharp decline in the euro's exchange rate - say, by 15 per cent - would remedy many of the euro zone's current economic problems. A weaker euro would raise the cost of imports and the potential prices of exports, thus pushing up the euro zone's overall inflation rate. Devaluation would also boost average euro zone GDP growth by stimulating exports and encouraging Europeans to substitute domestically produced goods and services for imported items. Although competitiveness within the euro zone would be unaffected, a weaker euro would significantly improve the external balance with the rest of the world, which accounts for about half of euro zone trade.

European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi has emphasised his concern that the euro's rise over the past three years has increased the risk of deflation. But it was his famous declaration in July 2012 that the ECB would do "whatever it takes" to preserve the euro that, while successful in reducing interest rates in the distressed countries of the euro zone periphery, also contributed to the euro's current strength.

Today, neither Mr Draghi's recent statements nor the prospect of an American-style programme of large-scale asset purchases (also known as quantitative easing) has caused the euro to weaken or the inflation rate to move back towards the target level of two per cent. So the operative question is how to reduce the euro's relative value while maintaining the perception of stability that Mr Draghi helped to establish in 2012.

Because quantitative easing by the ECB has been advocated as a way to weaken the euro, it is worthwhile to examine the impact of its use by the Federal Reserve on the value of the dollar and the inflation rate in the United States.

The short answer is that it did very little to affect either. The real trade-weighted value of the dollar is now at the same level that it was in 2007, before the onset of the Great Recession. It rose briefly during the peak crisis year of 2008, as global investors sought the safe haven of dollar-denominated assets, but retreated during 2009 to its previous level. The dollar's value then remained relatively stable during more than three years of quantitative easing - and actually rose during 2013, when the Fed's asset purchases reached a high of more than $1 trillion.

Of course, other factors influenced the dollar's value during this period as well. Nonetheless, the behaviour of the dollar's exchange rate during the period of quantitative easing offers no support for the proposed use of large-scale asset purchases by the ECB as a way to bring about euro depreciation.

The Fed's quantitative easing also did not cause an increase in the rate of inflation. The consumer price index rose by 1.6 per cent in 2010, when quantitative easing began, then increased somewhat faster in 2011 and 2012, before dropping back to a gain of just 1.5 per cent in 2013, the peak year for asset purchases.

If the ECB wants to reduce the value of the euro and increase the euro zone's near-term inflation rate, the only reliable way to do so may be by direct intervention in the currency market - that is, selling euros and buying a basket of other currencies. While direct intervention to weaken the euro would create challenges in other parts of the world, policymakers in the US and elsewhere should recognise the importance of a more competitive euro to the future of the European economy.

The writer is professor of economics at Harvard University.
Project Syndicate, 2014


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Tuesday, February 19, 2013

Mario Draghi at the hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament




Introductory statement at the hearing of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament

Speech by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Brussels, 18 February 2013


Madam Chair,

Honourable members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs,

It is a pleasure to be back here in Parliament and in front of your Committee for our regular exchange of views.

We enter 2013 in a more stable financial environment than in recent years. This has been achieved through concerted reforms by governments and parliaments and decisive actions by European institutions. But considerable further efforts are needed to ensure that Europe continues emerging from the crisis, re-creates confidence among investors and citizens, and re-establishes stability and growth.

This house has a key role to play in the reform agenda. I am thinking in particular of the adoption of the legislation for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. This is of crucial importance for progress towards financial union.

Today, I will first review economic and monetary developments in the euro area since December. I will then address the two topics that you have selected for our discussion: the impact of a low interest rate environment; and the establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism.

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Economic and monetary developments

Since our last meeting, the Governing Council has left key ECB rates unchanged: the main refinancing rate currently stands at 0.75%; the rate on the deposit facility stands at 0%; and the rate on the marginal lending facility stands at 1.50%.

Economic activity contracted for a third consecutive quarter in the fourth quarter of 2012. Available indicators signal further weakness at the beginning of 2013, with domestic demand remaining dampened. This is due to weak consumer and investor sentiment and to the necessary balance sheet adjustments in both the public and private sectors. Foreign demand also remains subdued.

Economic weakness in the early part of 2013 is expected to be followed by a very gradual recovery later in the year. Strengthening global demand, our accommodative monetary policy stance and the improvement in financial market confidence across euro area countries should all work their way through to spending and investment decisions and support the recovery.

Even though we have yet to see sustained improvement in the real economy, survey indicators have confirmed earlier evidence of a stabilisation of business and consumer confidence, albeit at low levels. Taking a somewhat longer view, the improvement in financial market confidence since last summer has been significant. As regards the exchange rate, let me be clear that the exchange rate is not a policy target, but it is important for growth and price stability.

Another sign of improved confidence is the larger than expected early repayment by counterparties in the first of our two three-year longer-term refinancing operations settled in December 2011 and March 2012. This indicates that banks are less uncertain about their funding prospects than a year ago. We will closely monitor conditions in the money market and their potential impact on the stance of monetary policy, which will remain accommodative with the full allotment mode of liquidity provision.

The risks surrounding the economic outlook for the euro area continue to be on the downside. They relate to the possibility of weaker than expected domestic demand and exports, slow implementation of structural reforms in the euro area, as well as geopolitical issues and imbalances in major industrialised countries which could both have an impact on developments in global commodities and financial markets. These factors have the potential to dampen the ongoing improvement in confidence and thereby delay the recovery.

Annual inflation in the euro area has continued to moderate, falling from 2.5% in October to 2.2% in November and December and 2.0% in January, as we had foreseen. Inflation is expected to decline to below 2% in the near term.

Risks to the outlook for price developments continue to be seen as broadly balanced over the medium term, with upside risks relating to higher administered prices and indirect taxes, as well as higher oil prices, and downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity and, more recently, the appreciation of the euro exchange rate. Inflation expectations for the euro area remain firmly in line with the Governing Council’s aim of maintaining annual inflation rates below, but close to, 2%.

Our monetary analysis is consistent with price stability. The underlying pace of monetary expansion and loan dynamics remain subdued. The annual growth rate of loans to the private sector remains negative. To a large extent, subdued loan dynamics reflect the current stage of the business cycle, heightened credit risk and the continuing process of deleveraging.

Overall, inflationary pressures should remain contained over the policy-relevant horizon. Taking the evidence together, this allows our monetary policy stance to remain accommodative.
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The impact of a low interest rate environment

Let me turn to the first topic that you have chosen for our meeting today, namely the implications of a low interest rate environment.

The impact of the global financial crisis on the economy and, potentially, on price developments has been unprecedented. We have taken unprecedented measures in response, aiming pre-emptively and forcefully to avert risks to price stability, in accordance with our primary mandate.

First, we have reduced our key interest rate to 0.75%, a level previously unseen in virtually all euro area countries. The interest rate in the overnight interbank market is now even lower, close to zero.

Second, we have acted to prevent an abrupt reduction in the supply of credit to the real economy. We have given banks unrestricted access to central bank funding in all our refinancing operations. We have extended significantly the average maturity of these operations. We have broadened the set of eligible collateral. This assurance of funding to banks has prevented disorderly deleveraging in the financial sector and averted a collapse in money and credit, with potentially severe implications for price stability, and thereby employment and growth.

All these decisions have ensured price stability and stabilised inflation expectations during an exceptional period.

Naturally, the ECB is aware of the challenges arising from a protracted period of low policy rates and ample liquidity. Let me elaborate on the three main challenges.

The first is that low interest rates may affect the ability of savers and investors to generate returns. This is especially the case for institutions targeting nominal returns, such as insurance companies and pension funds. Yet, by ensuring price stability throughout the crisis, monetary policy has contributed to more stable financial conditions. This is central to the interests of savers and investors: there can only be sustainable returns in a stable environment.

The second challenge relates to incentives. A protracted period of low interest rates and ample liquidity facilitates rolling-over loans at very low costs. Banks may therefore have less incentive to monitor credit risk properly and may provide too many loans to non-profitable business. Over time, such misallocation of financial resources would undermine overall productivity and depress growth and employment.

The third challenge is that protracted monetary accommodation may fuel bubbles in house prices and other asset markets. As the crisis has painfully demonstrated, the bursting of such bubbles inflicts large costs for the real economy.

In this context, a natural question is whether monetary policy should be used actively to contain asset price booms and bubbles – a response known as ‘leaning against the wind’. Thanks to our monetary policy strategy, implicitly we do this to some extent. We focus on the medium-term horizon and take account of monetary developments in assessing risks to price stability.

Having said that, let us be clear that changes in policy interest rates are normally not the first best instrument for addressing financial imbalances. They should be considered only under very special circumstances, for example when a widespread rise in asset prices threatens price stability in the euro area as a whole. In the absence of such imbalances relevant from a euro area perspective, the appropriate tools to counter imbalances in the financial sector and possible asset price misalignments are at the country level. To avoid the build-up of excessive risks in the financial system or housing markets, national authorities have appropriate tax and supervisory instruments at their disposal.

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The establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism

Let me turn to your second chosen topic, the establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism.

The Single Resolution Mechanism should be centred in a Single Resolution Authority with a European Resolution Fund at its disposal. I welcome the European Council’s December statement that during the course of 2013, the Commission will submit a proposal for such a mechanism for Member States that are participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism.

The ECB shares the European Council’s view on timing for the Single Resolution Mechanism, namely that it will be required once bank supervision is effectively moved to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. We therefore welcome the European Council urging the co-legislators to examine the proposal as a matter of priority with the intention of adopting it during the current parliamentary cycle.

There are four main reasons for a Single Resolution Mechanism, with a Single Resolution Authority at its centre.

The first reason is that only a Single Resolution Authority will ensure timely and impartial decision-making focused on the European dimension. In a situation where a cross-border resolution is required, the Single Resolution Authority would avoid national focus and pursue the optimal resolution strategy, thus mitigating coordination problems.

The second reason is that the Single Resolution Authority would credibly pursue the least cost resolution strategy, assessing possible cross-border spillover effects and systemic concerns, and ensuring that resolution costs are first and foremost borne by the private sector. It would thereby minimise resolution costs without recourse to taxpayer money.

The third reason is that the Single Resolution Authority is an essential complement to the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Single Supervisory Mechanism will provide a timely and unbiased assessment of the need for resolution, while the Single Resolution Authority will ensure prompt and efficient action once the trigger is reached. This will avoid misaligned incentives that could arise with supervision moved to the European level while resolution responsibility remained national.

The fourth reason is that a Single Resolution Authority would help to break the vicious bank-sovereign nexus.

The Single Resolution Authority naturally needs to be strong and effective to deliver what is needed. This requires three features to be fulfilled:

First, the Single Resolution Authority needs to dispose of a robust resolution framework, one that provides it with enforceable resolution tools and powers. In this respect, the proposed bank recovery and resolution directive is key. Adoption of the directive, ideally by June, is an urgently needed step towards a strong European resolution framework.

Second, the Single Resolution Authority needs access to resolution financing. It should therefore have a European Resolution Fund at its disposal, which should be financed by the private sector via risk-based ex ante levies. The European Resolution Fund should be backed by a public backstop mechanism, the support of which would need to be recouped via special ex post levies on the private sector. This means that it would be fiscally neutral over the medium term.

Third, the Single Resolution Authority should have an institutional set-up that allows for independence, sufficient operational capacity and a robust accountability framework with effective judicial protection against resolution decisions ex post.

The Commission is currently assessing the options for the institutional anchoring of the Single Resolution Authority. I am looking forward to its proposal, which will need to ensure these three essential features.


Thank you for your attention. I am now at your disposal for questions.
European Central Bank
Directorate General Communications and Language Services
Press and Information Division
Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, Fax: +49 69 1344 7404
Internet: http://www.ecb.europa.eu

Reproduction is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.


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